It was found that military leaders not only have predetermined attitudes toward all existing effectiveness measures, but that even when this rater bias Is controlled, there exists a definite preference for specific groups of measures.
INTRODUCTION
A critical facet of successful operations by any organization is the continual monitoring of organizational performance. The information gathered through such activity is of importance for the development of realistic goals, for planning optimal strategies for achieving these goals, and for the identification and remediation of organizational deficiencies. Nowhere is organizational effectiveness measurement more vital than in the military, given the potentially disastrous consequences of misjudging national defense capabilities. Further, the estimate of aggregate military potential has broader national implications Inasmuch as such estimates influence decisions in other areas of national concern, such as development of Federal budget priorities and the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Thus, the development of means to accurately assess the strengths and deficiencies of military units is a vital concern both for the military as well as for our larger society.
Given the Importance of measuring unit effectiveness, it Is not surprising that the Army has traditionally monitored quantified measures of many facets of unit operations at all echelons. These measures have encompassed such disparate areas as the compilation of the maintenance status of mission-essential equipment to the tallying of chapel attendance by unit personnel. The manifest Importance of unit effectiveness assessment is evidenced by the command attention paid to it and the diversity of measures employed in this assessment. Despite such attention, however, there has been a growing body of criticism regarding the accuracy and adequacy of current methods of monitoring the effectiveness of Army units. College, 1976 ). This degree of attention is appropriate since this system constitutes the major means by which higher echelons monitor the effectiveness of Army battalions and separate companies. Even though the data from this reporting system provide major input to the development of Army contingency plans and guide high level resource allocation decisions, the consensus of opinion of those who have examined this system is that it is seriously faulted. As an example, in the Army War College study (U.S. Army War College, 1976), questionnaires measuring perceptions regarding the Unit Status Report (USR) were administered to approximately 2100 Army personnel. A full 70 percent of this sample reported that the USR does not reflect the true readiness condition of a unit. This opinion was likewise voiced in the course of interviews with over 1200 personnel conducted as another component of this same study. In addition to some technical problems in the actual computation of Indices contained on the USR, this study found two major factors undermining the accuracy and credibility of this reporting system. The first factor concerned the substantial degree of latitude for subjective interpretation of unit conditions that was permitted in filling out the Unit Status Report. As an example, the Training Readiness Condition index, which constitutes a major component . -
Much of this criticism has centered around reported deficiencies in

I .
■ of the unit's readiness, Is based totally upon the unit commander's subjective estimate of the number of weeks of training the unit would need to be fully ready for combat. It was the conclusion of this study that "The training portion of the USR was too subjective to be anything more than a wlshfulthlnklng guess. The second major problem in the USR uncovered In the Army War College study concerned a conviction by those surveyed and Interviewed that there was pressure on unit commanders to portray the unit's capabilities In the best possible light even to the extent of masking genuine unit deficiencies. This problem area Is one which bodes 111 not only for the validity of the Unit Status Report Itself, but also for the validity of any systematized quantification of unit readiness Indices. A key conclusion of this study therefore was that the current Unit Status Report reflected Army units not as they actually were but rather the units as all would wish them to be.
Since the publication of that study, efforts have been made to revise and Improve unit readiness reporting by Increasing the reliance on objective measurements of unit conditions rather than on the subjective Interpretation of the unit's capabilities. As of 1980, however, Sorley held that the Unit Status Reporting system continued to suffer major deficiencies. The most central of these deficiencies continued to be the need to separate the process of evaluating and monitoring unit effectiveness from the process by which the performance of Army officers is evaluated. Sorley believes that only by removing the responsibility for unit readiness reporting from the chain of command, which likewise evaluates the performance of the individuals who provide unit effectiveness data, can the real or perceived pressure to inflate estimates of unit effectiveness be removed.
Sorley further holds that the Unit Status Report has excluded variables which are essential to combat readiness and therefore the USR can only partially reflect the total capability of the unit. Factors such as unit cohesion and the turnover and competence of key unit personnel are those which he feels are important contributors to total unit capability but which are not now employed in estimating the unit's effectiveness. Sorley likewise suggests that the information contained on the USR be complemented with the professional judgment of individuals familiar with the unit. This, of course, would only be feasible where this judgment could be rendered frankly and openly.
The evaluation of unit effectiveness in the Army is not restricted to the USR. The Army has had a long tradition of monitoring an extensive series of variables which purportedly reflect the state of morale and discipline in the unit. Known collectively as "command Indicators" or "traditional Indicators," this set of unit measures typically Includes such variables as reenllstment rates, crime rates, and Indices associated with the administration of military justice. Unlike the USR measures, these Indices are not systematically reported at the unit level to the higher echelons of the Army command structure. However, unit measures on these variables are used frequently at the local level as indicants of unit conditions and problems. Sorley (1979) has been critical of the use of such measures inasmuch as he sees them leading to a "management by statistics" in which those factors which are more readily quantifiable are given greater command emphasis than those which are more difficult to quantify, but which more substantively support and reflect unit effectiveness. Too often, he feels, command attention is expended on "getting the numbers right" in such areas of questionable military value as motor vehicle accident rates or the number of letters of indebtedness among unit personnel. This occurs at the expense of diverting command attention from such areas as unit training and equipment maintenance, which are more directly supportive of the unit's I mission. The position underlying'his assertions is that statistical indices of unit operations, particularly those relevant to the personnel area, are of questionable utility In assessing areas pertinent to unit effectiveness. This is somewhat Inconsistent with his position (Sorley, 1980) that the USR be supplemented with measures in such areas as drug abuse, race relations, and the alienation and commitment of the unit personnel. Clearly, some statistical indices are more germane to unit effectiveness assessment than others. The question remains unresolved as to the identity of these measures. The prolif-«^ eratlon of statistical Indices used to monitor unit functioning has been fed by the variation in opinion as to which of the wide variety of possible measures are the most accurate Indicants of unit capability. This proliferation ;-'J has in turn led to many of the abuses and problems which have been identified ' \ ;.-in tbe literature. I ii'
The purpose of this research is to contribute to the resolution of these problems by examining the value of the most typically employed statistical indices in reflecting unit effectiveness. To date there has been no systematic examination across the broad spectrum of unit effectiveness measures which would permit a determination of the relative value of these measures. The absence of such information leaves unchallenged the possible reliance on " , Inaccurate or Incomplete assessment of unit effectiveness and thus the development of priorities based on apparent rather than real problems.
METHOD
Forty-eight battalion commanders, twenty-eight brigade commanders, and eight general officers located at six CONUS installations were interviewed on the topic of battalion effectiveness. During the approximately one-hourlong interviews, each subject was asked to discuss the most pressing management problems confronting him in maintaining readiness, to operationally define battalion effectiveness, and to evaluate the performance of his sub-^ ^ ordlnate battalions. Each subject was also asked to assess various given i V measures of battalion effectiveness. These measures can be classified > into three groups: Readiness Measures, Command Indicators, and Personal Judgments. Subjects were asked to indicate "how accurate an assessment of battalion effectiveness would be if it were based on any single piece of information from the list provided." A measure providing complete accuracy would be rated 100%, while a measure providing no information on unit effectiveness would be rated 0Z.
Subjects were further asked to choose from the given list of measures the five which, in combination, would provide "the most complete picture of a battalion's overall effectiveness." i
RESULTS
Analyses of these data began with an examination of the degree to which there was a difference in the perceived validity of the effectiveness measures across positions (i.e., battalion commander vs. brigade commander vs. general officer). A three-level one-way ANOVA was therefore performed on the validity ratings given to each of the unit effectiveness measures. Of the twenty-two measures tested, on only one was there a significant position difference (Drug Arrest Rate). It was concluded that there existed no consistent position differences in the perceived validity of the unit effectiveness measures, since such a proportion of significant results is essentially what would be expected | from chance alone. Accordingly, the data from the three groups were combined in all further analyses.
The mean accuracy ratings assigned to each measure are rank ordered and presented in Table 1 . As shown, a wide range of mean ratings was obtained, varying from 72.5% accuracy attributed to ARTEP results to an accuracy rating of only 29.2% for desertion rates. In general, the Readiness Measures and the Personal Judgments were given the highest validity as measures which individually render an accurate assessment of a battalion's effectiveness. Table 2 presents a rank ordering of the frequency with which each measure was included in the group of five providing thf: most complete picture of a battalion's effectiveness. The sharp drop in the frequency of selection after the fourth measure indicates that these first four are Important measures in providing an overall effectiveness assessment. Measures of readiness, specifically the ARTEP and AGI, and the personal Judgments of those in the unit, specifically the company grade officers and NCOs, were seen to provide the most informaticu about battalion effectiveness. Further, the top four measures in Table 2 are the same as the top four in Table 1 , implying that these measures are the most valid, whether they are considered individually or in combination. For the most part, the group of command indicators are locatec. at the bottom of the continuum on both Tables 1 and 2.
As seen in Table 1 , all measures within each group (Command Indicators, Personal Judgments, Readiness Measures) tended to be assigned similar accuracy ratings. Thus, there appears to have been a consistent rating applied to all measures within each of the three groups of measures. That is, while the Judgments of unit NCOs may have been accorded higher validity by subjects than the judgment of division commanders, the fact that both measures entail personal judgments tended to produce very similar validity ratings for both -measures. To test this, coefficient alphas were computed for each of the three groups to determine the internal consistency of this grouping. These reliability measures are presented in Table 3A . All three coefficient alphas are above .89, revealing a high degree of Internal consistency within each group of effectiveness measures.
' In order to detect whether there was a consistent style of rating (i.e., preference of one group of measures to the exclusion of others), the relationships among the three groups of measures was examined. A mean rating was computed for each subject for each of three groups of measures. Pearson correlations were in turn computed among these mean ratings. These Intergroup correlations are presented in Table 4A . A substantial positive correlation exists among the three groups, suggesting , that even In the presence of a wide variation of mean ratings (as shown in Table 1 ), there was a tendency for subjects to display a rater bias reflecting a global impression of the validity of any formal effectiveness measure. Thus, a subject who gave high ratings to one group of measures likewise gave high ratings to the other two groups. As an extreme example, one subject's accuracy ratings of the individual measures ranged from 90-100, while another's ranged from 0-16. Thus, to correct for this rater bias, a set of corrected ratings was computed for each subject on each measure. This was accomplished by first computing the average rating on all measures given by each subject. Each subject's average rating was then subtracted from his original rating on each measure to establish a set of corrected ratings for each subject. n The rank ordering for these corrected ratings agrees totally with the rank ordering of the uncorrected ratings (Table 1), indicating that these earlier results were not artifacts of subjects' biases toward effectiveness measures in general. Thus, the ordering of the ratings for those with high confidence in unit effectiveness measures is the same as that for those with low confidence in unit effectiveness measures. The existence of this rater bias, however, does raise the possibility that the high internal consistencies in each of three groups of measures was not due to these existing as natural groupings in the minds of the raters, but rather was an artifact of the rater bias. It is possible that the rater bias produced high intercorrelations among the ratings given to all of the unit performance measures. This would in turn produce high coefficient alphas for the ratings given to the measures within each of the groups. This interpretation is made plausible by the substantial positive correlations among the mean ratings given to each group of measures (Table 4A) . To test this Interpretation, coefficient alphas were recomputed for each of the three groups, based on the corrected ratings. These reliability measures are presented in Table 3B . Though the alphas drop slightly from those based on the uncorrected ratings, the Internal consistency of the groups remains acceptable, indicating that while these coefficient alphas were Inflated by the rater bias, they were not totally attributable to them.
Intercorrelations among the three groups of measures were next computed, based on the corrected ratings. These Intercorrelations are presented In Table AB , showing correlations which are negative, in contrast to those based on uncorrected ratings (Table AA) 
664
.^^1
:i^___" 
